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Abstract 
From an inconsistent database non-trivial 
arguments may be constructed both for a 
proposition, and for the contrary of that 
proposition. Therefore, inconsistency in a 
logical database causes uncertainty about 
which conclusions to accept. This kind of 
uncertainty is called logical uncertainty. We 
define a concept of "acceptability" , which in­
duces a means for differentiating arguments. 
The more acceptable an argument, the more 
confident we are in it. A specific interest is 
to use the acceptability classes to assign lin­
guistic qualifiers to propositions, such that 
the qualifier assigned to a propositions re­
flects its logical uncertainty. A more general 
interest is to understand how classes of ac­
ceptability can be defined for arguments con­
structed from an inconsistent database, and 
how this notion of acceptability can be de­
vised to reflect different criteria. Whilst con­
centrating on the aspects of assigning linguis­
tic qualifiers to propositions, we also indicate 
the more general significance of the notion of 
acceptability. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
For classical logic, the presence of an inconsistency in a 
logical theory is pathological; everything follows from 
a deduction of falsum, ..L. This property of classical 
logic - and also of intuitionistic and many modal log­
ics - is not, however, a feature which is reflected in 
"pragmatic" - in the sense of everyday - reasoning. 
Gabbay and Hunter (1991) argue from a number of 
cases that people generally have an ability to localize 
inconsistency, and often suspend the resolution of a 
contradiction if it does not involve information which 
is directly relevant to the action at hand. There has 
been a steady interest in developing models for rea­
soning in the presence of inconsistent data in both 
the AI (Dubois, Lang & Prade, 1992; Fox, Krause & 
Ambler, 1992; Perlis, 1989; Wagner, 1991; Benferhat, 
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Dubois & Prade, 1993) and philosophical logic (Nel­
son, 1949; Priest, 1989; Priest, Routley & Normann, 
1988) communities. Here we will describe a form of di­
alectic reasoning, in which the presence of arguments 
both for and against a proposition does not lead to 
trivialization, but merely affects the "acceptability" of 
the proposition (and the propositions to which it is 
related). Our motivation is to understand how cer­
tain arguments constructed using classical logic from 
an inconsistent database can be taken to be more ac­
ceptable than others. We want to be able to make 
such a differentiation purely on the basis of the argu­
ments that can be constructed from a database. The 
solution we suggest assigns different degrees of accept­
ability to arguments on the basis of other constructible 
arguments. We view these different degrees of accept­
ability as reflecting a kind of uncertainty, which we call 
logical uncertainty. 
To aid the understanding of acceptability as logical 
uncertainty, a linguistic qualifier is assigned to each of 
the respective acceptability classes. The particular use 
of linguistic qualifiers to express uncertainty has been 
addressed by a number of authors. Most give such 
terms a semantics in terms of interval valued probabil­
ities (Dubois et al, 1992) or fuzzy sets (Zadeh, 1975). 
However, Fox (1986) held that such terms were more 
naturally defined on a qualitative, or symbolic, basis. 
The advantages of the use of predicates defined on the 
basis of patterns of argument were demonstrated in a 
prototype medical decision making application (Fox et 
al, 1990). In this paper we will offer a set of linguistic 
qualifiers which are defined on purely logical grounds. 
As we worked with the linguistic qualifiers we discov­
ered that the classification we gave of arguments ac­
cording to their degree of acceptability had a signifi­
cance beyond the application to the assignment of the 
linguistic terms. It is possible to reformulate the for­
malisms defined by various authors using the notion of 
acceptability. As a specific example, we will consider 
Poole's notion of specificity (Poole 1985). After hav­
ing discussed how various degrees of acceptability can 
be introduced purely on the basis of the constructible 
arguments, we also consider how the notion of accept­
ability can be extended to allow additional criteria to 
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Figure 1: Toulmin's Schema 
be taken into account. As a specific example, we will 
indicate how explicit priorities can be taken into ac­
count. There are several ways in which this can be 
done, cf. for instance Hunter (1992), and we will just 
consider one of these. 
The consequence relations we introduce for construct­
ing arguments are defined as a Labelled Deductive 
Systems (LDS) , cf. Gabbay (1992). The main idea of 
LDS is that of labelling formulas and using information 
stored in these labels. This idea fits well with what we 
are doing. The idea of using arguments as the fun­
damental logical entity is inspired by, but not directly 
based on, work on the development of a "Logic of Ar­
gumentation" (Fox et al, 1992; Krause et al, 1993). In 
this paper we relate our work instead to the philosoph­
ical account of arguments offered by Toulmin (1956). 
The structure of the main body of the paper is as de­
scribed above. We start by defining our general model 
for dialectic reasoning with inconsistent information. 
This model gives a general definition of what we call 
"systems of argumentation". Alongside this definition 
we draw some parallels to existing formalism. 
2 ARGUMENTATION 
We model dialectic reasoning with inconsistent infor­
mation as argumentation, which we define as the con­
struction and use of arguments. Argumentation is a 
general principle, which can be instantiated with spe­
cific ways of constructing and using arguments. A spe­
cific instance of the argumentation principle is called a 
"system of argumentation". 'vVe introduce the general 
principle of argumentation and explain it through a 
simple example. 
Toulmin (1956) provides an informal model of argu­
mentation, which in it's basic form can be illustrated 
as in Figure 1 (Toulmin, 1956, p. 99). Informally, Toni­
min's "schema" reads as this: "Warranted by the gen­
eral principles, W, conclusion C can be concluded from 
the facts, D". The essence of Toulmin's account is that 
arguments carry information about the facts and war­
rants from which the conclusion of the argument has 
been established. For similar reasons we assign labels 
to arguments, and in our account arguments are mod­
elled as pairs, the first component is the conclusion of 
the argument and the second component is the label of 
the argument. The label carries, using Toulmin's ter­
minology, information about the facts and warrants of 
the argument. For each specific definition of an argu­
ment, in a system of argumentation, the label must 
carry sufficient information for assessing the accept­
ability of the argument, cf. below. 
We model facts as items in a labelled database, where 
each fact is assigned a unique label. We call such 
databases "flat", if there is no structure imposed on 
the labels and "prioritized" otherwise. In the last sec­
tion we will discuss the use of priorities, but until then 
we only consider flat databases. The following exam­
ple indicates how information in a database can be 
labelled. 
Example of a fiat database, called KM: (Literates 
will recognize r4 as "modus Montanus" (Holberg) .) 
r1: mother(x)-+ •flies(x) 
r2: mother(x)-+ -,stone(x) 
r3: stone(x)-+ •flies(x) 
r4: q-+ ((p-+ q) -+ p) 
/1 : mother(K aren) 
Warrants are throughout modelled as rules of classi­
cal logic, and they are assigned a passive role in the 
present account of argumentation. 
Having decided what form facts and warrants have, 
we can define how arguments can be constructed. The 
"constructible" arguments from a specific database are 
defined by an "argumentation consequence relation". 
In the definition of an argumentation consequence re­
lation, it must be made explicit how information about 
the argument is aggregated in its label. 
By way of illustration, we continue the example. Con­
sider the following consequence relation, consisting of 
two rules. Ax allows for facts in the database to be 
used and Modus Ponens, -+-E, allows for these facts 
to be combined. (Ax and -+-E are part of the inference 
system defined in Figure 2.) 
Example of an arg. cons. rei.: 
Ax ]{ f- (p, 
a) 
(p, a) E K 
-+-E ]{ f- (p -+ q, a) I< f- (p, b) 
Kf-(q, aub) 
The definition makes explicit how the labels of the 
facts in some database, ]{, are propagated in the con­
struction of arguments. Here, arguments are pairs of 
a formula and a set of labels of facts in the database 
on which the argument is based. For simplicity we 
consider facts to be labelled with singleton sets. For 
instance (mother(Karen), {f1}) E KM. 
From the database KM and the argumentation con­
sequence relation defined above, we can construct the 
following arguments: 
(•stone(K aren), {/1, r2}) 
(stone(Karen), {!1, rl, r3, r4}) 
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Ax (p,a) E K Y-Il ]{ 1- (q, a) I< F (p,a) J{ F (pVq,a) 
T-1 
I< 
1- (T, 0) Y-12 
]{ 1- (q, a) 
Kl-(pVq, a) 
_._1 K, (p, 0
) 1- (q, a) 
I< I- (p�q, a) 
Y-E Kl-(pVq, a) I<, (p, a) 1- (r, b') I<, (q, a) 1- (r, b") 
I<l-(p->q,a) I<l-(p, b) ->-E 
I<l-(q, aub) 
•-I K, (•p,0) 1- (l-,a) 
J{ 1- (p, a) 
A-I I<l-(p, a) Kl
-(q, b) I<l-(p, a) I<l-(-.p, a) •-E 
J{ 1- (1_, a) ]{ 1- (p/\q,aUb) 
J{ 1- (p/\q, a) A-El J( 1- (p, a) 
J{ 1- (p 1\ q, a) A-E2 
K 1- (q, a) EFQ 
K 1- (1_, a) 
I{ 1- (p, a) 
Figure 2: Argumentation Consequence Relation 
Suppose we want to draw a conclusion from this set, 
called AM, of arguments. Before we can do so we must 
agree on a policy for drawing such conclusions, and we 
then define such a policy as a flattening function (the 
terminology is due to Gabbay 1992). In the case of the 
above example, we have decided to allow arguments 
to be based on any fact in the database apart from 
"modus Mont anus". 
Example of a simple flattening function: Let A 
be any set of arguments. Then: 
Flat( A) = {p I (3a)((p, a) E A 1\ r4 �a)} 
Therefore, the result of flattening the above two argu­
ments, 
Flat(AM) = {•stone(Karen)}, 
reveals that Mother Karen is not made of stone. This 
policy is indeed very simple and specific for the exam­
ple we have given. 
So far a system of argumentation is nothing but a LDS 
and everything we have done is in the realm of the gen­
eral definitions that Gab bay (1992) gives. We will now 
specialize our framework towards handling inconsis­
tency by formalizing the notion of acceptability. This 
notion appears to be fundamental for the uses of argu­
ment to handle logical uncertainty. It will be used here 
for making uniform definitions of flattening functions 
that reveal the logical uncertainty inherent in a set of 
arguments. 
Before proceeding with this, we will recall Toulmin's 
account of this problem. According to Toulmin, an 
argument can be represented as a conclusion together 
with with information about the facts and warrants 
from which the argument can be constructed. Pre­
sented with such an argument, doubts may be raised 
in either its conclusion or in the facts and warrants 
supporting the conclusion. If sufficiently convincing 
arguments can be constructed for doubt in the conclu­
sion of an argument, the argument is said to be "rebut­
ted". If, on the other hand, convincing arguments can 
be constructed for doubt in the facts or warrants from 
which an argument has been constructed, then the ar­
gument is said to have been "undercut". This defines, 
in principle, two notions of defeat which are common 
in the AI literature. cf. for example, Loui's notion of 
defeasible arguments (Loui, 1987), Nute's (1988) and 
Pollock's (1992) models of defeasible reasoning. How­
ever, in all these three cases propositions can only be 
assigned to one of the classes true or false. We wish to 
assign a finer grading than just truth and falsity, which 
better reflects the logical certainty of a proposition. 
The approach we take is to define classes of accept­
ability for constructible arguments. Such classes are 
called "acceptability classes" and they can be .defined 
for any argumentation consequence relation. Some of 
the defined classes will be counted as more acceptable 
than others. This induces an "acceptability ordering" 
over arguments, defining different discrete "degrees of 
acceptability" that an argument can have. The "ac­
ceptability of an argument" is defined as its maximal 
degree(s) of acceptability if any such can be defined. 
Arguments of the same degree of acceptability are in­
tented to have the same logical certainty. A specific 
acceptability class is defined relative to other classes 
of arguments as well as by the use of some absolute 
requirements. An acceptability class can be conceived 
as the set of all those arguments from some set (the set 
of defining arguments) that are able to pay the price 
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for membership. This price consists of two parts, each 
of which must be settled: 
• an absolute requirement, and 
• a requirement relative to some set of arguments 
(the set of moderating arguments). 
The notion of acceptability induces a flattening policy, 
by picking the most acceptable arguments. This pro­
vides a firm basis for imposing (non-logical) heuristics 
for resolving inconsistencies and making decisions, and 
it allows for the introduction of uncertainty measures 
to assert varying degrees of acceptability. Our main 
example, which occupies the rest of this paper, will 
further clarify these remarks and also the vague terms 
in which the whole notion of acceptability has been 
introduced. 
Preliminary investigations have shown that instances 
of the proposed framework embrace several formal sys­
tems. We already mentioned three above, and all of 
these appear to be reexpressible in terms of accept­
ability. As one specific example, we will argue that 
Poole's notion of specificity is a specific instance of ac­
ceptability. A similar argument can be constructed for 
the work of Wagner (1991). 1 
Specificity as acceptability: Poole (1985) has an 
argument-like notion called "explanation" . An expla­
nation is constructed using classical entailment from 
contingent facts together with a set of necessary facts 
and hypotheses. Specificity corresponds to the mini­
mal set of contingent facts (required for some set of hy­
potheses to participate in giving an explanation) being 
of a certain "size" , i.e. the larger the more specific, and 
this induces a specificity ordering among arguments. 
The notion of being most specific is relative to other 
arguments. Consider as an example the set of hypothe­
ses: {p ----> q, p 1\ r ----> -.q}, the set of necessary facts 0 
and the set of contingent facts {p, r }. From this set of 
hypotheses and facts, using Poole's definition we can 
construct a minimal argument {p,r,pl\r---+ -.q} r -.q, 
for -.q which is more specific than the minimal argu­
ment {p,p ----> q} r q, which we can construct for q. 
Hence -.q is the more acceptable claim in this context. 
Specificity is a notion of accf!ptability defined using 
logical as well as non-logical means. The non-logical 
part stems from the delimitation of the necessary facts. 
We summarize this section by making precise what a 
system of argumentation is. 
System of Argumentation: A system of argumen­
tation is an argumentation consequence relation and 
a flattening function induced by a notion of accept­
ability. The argumentation consequence relation de­
scribes how new arguments can be constructed from 
1 Lately, we realised that our views appear, especially 
as formulated in an earlier paper Elvang, Krause & Fox 
(1993), to coincide closely with those of Pinkas & Loui 
(1992) and that their "cautiousness" is similar to our 
acceptability. 
a database and a set of warrants. Arguments carry 
labels with information about their support. The flat­
tening function defines how conclusions are selected 
from a set of arguments, using a notion of acceptabil­
ity that has been designed to reflect the information 
that is available about individual arguments. 
This definition is a quite general specialization of the 
notion of a LDS, which as argued above, fits in with 
many existing formalisms. 
In the remaining sections we concentrate on defining a 
system of argumentation that assigns linguistic qual­
ifiers to arguments constructed from an inconsistent 
database. 
3 CONSTRUCTING ARGUMENTS 
We define an argumentation consequence relation, 
where formulas are labelled with the names of the facts 
from which they have been derived (just as in the pre­
vious example). 
Database: A database, K, is any, consistent or in­
consistent, set of uniquely named propositions. If 
(p, { l}) E K, where 1 is labelling the proposition p, 
then K(l) = p. 
For simplicity we assume that there is a one-one cor­
respondence between fact names and facts in any 
database, and it therefore makes sense to refer to the 
(set of) fact(s) labelled by a (set of) label(s). 
Argument: Let p be a proposition and a a set of fact 
names. Then (p, a) is an argument for p supported by 
a, iff a is a minimal set of labels, such that: 
J( r (p, a) . 
The argumentation consequence relation is defined in 
Figure 2. 
Non-trivial argument: An argument (p, a) is non­
trivial if the set of facts labelled by a is consistent. 
Tautological argument: An argument (p, a) is tau­
tological if a = 0. 
Defeat: Let (p,a) and (q,b) be arguments from J(. 
The argument (q, b) can be defeated in one of two ways. 
Firstly, (p, a) "rebuts" ( q, b) if p ----> -.q. Secondly, (p, a) 
"undercuts" ( q, b) if for some / E b, labelling a fact r, 
p----> -.r. 
4 ACCEPTABILITY CLASSES 
'vVe may now define a hierarchy of acceptability classes 
using the logical notions of defeat and argument. The 
classes defined in Figure 3 reflect increasing degrees 
of acceptability, for arguments constructible from any 
database K. We can now further clarify our distinc­
tion between relative and absolute membership crite­
ria. The absolute criteria for membership of A1, A2 
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A1(K) 
A2(K) 
Aa(K) 
A1(K) 
As(K) 
= {(p,a) l(p , a) is an argument from K} 
{(p,a) E A1(K)I(p,a) is non-trivial} 
= {(p,a) E A2(K)I-{3b)((-,p,b) E A2(K))} 
{(p,a) E A3(K)I(Vl E a)((-,(3b)((-,K(l),b) E A2(K)))} 
{(p,a) E A4(K)I(p, a) is a tautological} 
Figure 3: Acceptability Classes 
and A5 are respectively that the arguments; simply 
exist, are consistent, and are tautological. For each 
class the relative criteria include membership of the 
previous class (if any). In addition, for A3 and A4 the 
relative criteria also include the notions of rebutting 
and undercutting defeat, respectively. The acceptabil­
ity classes have the following relationships 
Properties: 
A5(K) 5; A4(K) 5; A3(K) 5; A2(K) 5; A1(K) 
The relation "more acceptable than" between argu­
ments is defined using the ordering that is induced by 
the set inclusion hierarchy of the acceptability classes: 
More acceptable than: Let (p, a) and (q, b) be ar­
guments from K. Then the argument (p , a) is more 
acceptable (w.r.t. K) than the argument (q, b), iff for 
some i, 1 � i � 5, (p, a) E A(K) and (q, b) (j. A;(K). 
If p, q are conclusions in arguments from K, then we 
say that p is more acceptable than q if p has an argu­
ment that is more acceptable than any argument for 
q. 
This hierarchy can be used as a basis for assigning 
qualifiers to propositions in such a way that their "log­
ical certainty" is reflected by these terms. 
5 LINGUISTIC QUALIFIERS 
We now assign linguistic qualifiers to arguments of 
varying degrees of acceptability. Any database, K, 
can be partitioned as defined in Figure 4, and this 
partitioning defines an assignment of linguistic quali­
fiers to the arguments that can be constructed from K. 
We understand the words "supported", . . .  and "cer­
tain" in F igure 4 to denote increasing certainty. For 
instance, probable(K) contains all constructible argu­
ments from K, that are at least plausible. 
The subset-ordering over the acceptability classes de­
fined in Figure 3, induces an acceptability relation over 
arguments, where "certain" is regarded as the best 
linguistic qualifier. Based on the assignment of lin­
guistic qualifiers to arguments, we can define a flat­
tening function, assigning the best linguistic qualifier 
to propositions that are the conclusions of some ar­
gument. The flattening function is defined over the 
supported( I<) = A1(K) 
p'lausible( K) A2(K) 
probable(!\.') A3(K) 
confirmed(K) A4(K) 
certain(K) A5(K) 
Figure 4: assignment of linguistic qualifiers 
set of all constructible arguments from some database 
K, and assigns qualifiers to propositions according to 
the criteria for assigning "basic" linguistic qualifiers to 
propositions, defined in Figure 5. 
Using the basic qualifiers defined in Figure 5, we can 
also define "hybrid" qualifiers as exemplified in Fig­
ure 6. Many more than these can in principle be 
defined, and a fuller vocabulary is considered in Fox 
(1986). However, in this paper we do not want to push 
the natural language analogies too far, and for some of 
the above suggestions we have clearly not quite cap­
tured the "common sense understanding" of the terms. 
For instance, implausible(p) might be better defined 
as plausible(-,p). 
Example: Let K be the database, labelled as fol­
lows: 
/1 : p r1 : p -+ q  
/2 : -,q r2 : q-+r 
f3 : s 
f4: -,p 
(This database is similar to KB1 in (Wagner 1991).) 
We will consider the acceptability of the arguments: 
1. (p, {!1}). 
2. (s, {!3} ). 
3. (r, {r1, r2,/1}). 
4. (-'-, {!1, /4}).  
5. (-.s, {/1, /4}). 
6. (p-+ r, {rl, r2} ). 
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supported(p) iff (3a)((p, a) E supported (K) - plausible(K)) 
plausible(p) iff (3a)((p, a) E plausible(K) - probable(K)) 
probabl e(p) iff (3a)((p, a) E probable(K) - confirmed (K)) 
confirmed(p) iff (3a)((p, a) E confirmed (!<) - certain (K)) 
certain(p) iff (3a)((p, a) E certain(K)) 
Figure 5: Basic Linguistic qualifiers 
Argument (1) is plausible, because its conclusion is 
a fact. (1) is not probable, because a rebutting ar­
gument can be constructed using the fact f4. (Since 
p can at the best be given a plausible argument, we 
have plausible(p).) Argument (2) is confirmed, be­
cause no rebutting or undercutting arguments can be 
constructed. It is interesting to note that the incon­
sistency of K does not affect the acceptability of (2). 
Argument (3) is plausible, because no rebutter can be 
constructed, but (3) is undercut by an argument for 
-.p. Arguments (4) and (5) are supported, but by def­
inition not plausible. Argument (6) is probable, but 
not confirmed, because ( -.(p-+ q), {/1, /2}) is a plau­
sible argument that undercuts (6). 
The above example reveals some interesting proper­
ties, which explicate how inconsistency in a database 
can be transformed into uncertainty about the answers 
that the database can give to queries. 
Properties: Suppose we have a database that can be 
disjointly partitioned as: 
K u K1 u K2 
and that K U K1 and K U K2 are consistent, but 
K1 U K2 is inconsistent. Then we have: Any argu­
ment constructible from 
• K will be confirmed, 
• KUK1 (or KUK2) will at least be plausible, and 
• K1 U K2 will be at least supported. 
6 USING PRIORITIES 
So far we have only been concerned with flat databa­
ses, where each piece of information is considered to 
be equally good. In this section we will consider how 
explicit priorities between facts can be used to define 
the acceptability of arguments. Priorities need not be 
given for all the information of a database, but can be 
limited to what we will call the "focus set", F. The 
set of labels of a database is then partitioned into a 
focus set and a "background set", B. The priorities, 
defined as a partial order >, over the focus set induces 
a partial ordering over the whole database as follows. 
opposed(p) 
doubted(p) 
dubious(p) 
rej ected(p) 
impossible(p) 
implausibl e(p) 
improbable(p) 
unconfirmed 
uncertain(p) 
iff supported( -.p) 
iff plausible( -.p) 
iff probable(-.p) 
iff confirmed(-.p) 
iff certain( -.p) 
iff -.plausible(p) 
iff -.probable(p) 
iff -.confirmed(p) 
iff -.certain(p) 
equivocal(p) iff 
probl ematic(p) iff 
supported(p) A supported( -.p) 
plausible(p) Aplausible(-.p) 
Figure 6: Hybrid Linguistic Qualifiers 
For some database with labels F U B, the partial order, 
>-, is induced: 
if l, m E F, l > m then 
if l E F, m E B then 
if l, m E B then 
no other items are related 
l >- m 
l >- m 
l = m 
For some database with an induced partial ordering, >­
and arguments, (p, a) and (q, b), the priority of (p, a) 
over (q, b), (p, a)>-p(q, b), is defined as: 
(31 E a, Vm E b)(l >- m). 
Respect can be paid to the priorities, by changing the 
definition of probable, cf. the acceptability class, A3. 
The refined definition of this class is: 
A3 (K) = 
{(p,a) E A2 (K)I 
-.(3b)((-.p, b) E A2 (K) A (p, a)'/p(-.p, b))} 
We will show by use of an example how the priorities 
over the focus set can be extended to a partial order 
over the full set of labels of a database, and how this 
affects the conclusions that can be drawn. 
Suppose we have the following database: 
/1: i 
/2: d 
r1 : gu-+ -.du 
r2: i-+ gu 
r3: d-+ du 
The database represents a doctor's conception of the 
status of his patient, who complains of pain in the 
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stomach. The patient explains that on different occa­
sions he has both what he considers as immediate ( i) 
and delayed (d) stomach pain after meals, but that the 
immediate pain is more dominant than the delayed. 
This defines the doctor's focus set as: 
{/1, /2} 
with the additional information that: 
/1 > /2. 
From past experience, the doctor knows that imme­
diate stomach pain after meals is an indicator of gas­
tric ulcer (gu) and that delayed pain is an indicator 
for duodenal ulcer (du). The doctor's experience also 
counts it as unlikely for these two diseases to occur si­
multaneously. Therefore, the doctor's background set 
IS: 
{r1,r2,r3} 
Using the acceptability classes defined in the previous 
section, i.e. without taking the dominance of (i) into 
account, we have a situation where any of the propo­
sitions du, -.du, gu, -.gu can at the very best be given 
a plausible argument. Neither of them have a proba­
ble argument. Therefore there is a conflict: neither is 
more acceptable than another. 
For the database above the partial order: 
/1 >- /2 >- r1 = r2 = r3, 
is induced. According to this definition, the argu­
ment ( -.du, {!1, r1, r2}) for -.du has higher accept­
ability than the argument (du, {!2, r3}) for du. Sim­
ilarly (gu, {/1, r2}) is of higher acceptability than 
( -.gu, {/2, r1, r3} ). 
Using the changed definitions, the doctor will be able 
to confirm for herself, that gastric ulcer is the most 
acceptable explanation of the patients symptoms. 
7 Final remarks 
Two different conclusions can be drawn from this pa­
per. First regarding the notion of acceptability, which 
we suggested as a tool aiding the resolution of con­
flicts arising from logical uncertainty. We think that 
the idea of classifying arguments according to their 
acceptability offers an interesting formalization of di­
alectic reasoning. We find it particular interesting that 
notions of acceptability appear to be implicit in many 
existing formalisms and hope that this new view on 
logical uncertainty can add further insight. 
Our conclusion regarding the assignment of linguistic 
qualifiers to acceptability classes is more soft. In dis­
cussing the work on linguistic qualifiers in this paper 
with colleagues, we have often described it as an "in­
teresting experiment" in reasoning under uncertainty. 
That seems to be a fair assessment of its current sta­
tus. \Ve are not suggesting that this work be taken 
as a serious suggestion for anything like a natural lan­
guage semantics, although it is our view that some of 
the natural language usage of the linguistic terms that 
we introduce have been covered. If the terms are then 
used in combination with more sophisticated systems 
of argumentation, like the one taking explicit priorities 
into account, then this may well provide sufficient dis­
criminatory power for many applications in decision 
support. This will be especially useful in those do­
mains where the elicitation of reliable numerical un­
certainty coefficients cannot be guaranteed. Models of 
uncertain reasoning based on a qualitative evaluation 
of arguments have been shown to perform effectively 
(Chard, 1991; O'Neil & Glowinski, 1990). Providing a 
more formal basis for such models will help in defin­
ing their properties, and in their further refinement, 
so this work does raise some exciting possibilities. 
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